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The purpose of this paper is to examine what key reform attempts during the 
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies reveal about the wider 
possibilities for social policy change in the United States. Most particularly, 
why were Presidents Clinton and Bush able to achieve their goals in some 
policy realms but so badly defeated in others? As argued, institutional variation 
from one policy area to another helps answer this question. On the one hand, 
strong institutional obstacles in the fields of Social Security and health 
insurance largely explain the defeat of the most ambitious social policy proposal 
put forward by each president. On the other hand, successful reforms occurred 
in a comparatively favourable institutional context. Yet, the analysis also 
suggests that paying close attention to the strategic ideas of political actors as 
they interact with existing institutions and policy legacies is necessary to fully 
understand the politics of social policy reform. 
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Le but de cet article est d’examiner ce que des tentatives majeures de réforme 
durant les présidences de Bill Clinton et de George W. Bush révèlent au sujet 
des possibilités de changement dans le domaine des politiques sociales aux 
Etats-Unis. Plus précisément, pourquoi les présidents Clinton et Bush furent-ils 
en mesure d’atteindre leurs objectifs dans certains secteurs tout en subissant de 
cuisantes défaites dans d’autres secteurs? Dans un premier temps, de puissants 
obstacles institutionnels dans les secteurs des retraites (Sécurité Sociale) et de 
l’assurance santé expliquent largement les défaites subies par les projets les 
plus ambitieux de chacun de ces deux présidents. Dans un second temps, les 
réformes qui connurent le succès eurent lieu dans un contexte institutionnel plus 
favorable. Cependant, l’analyse révèle la nécessité d’explorer en détail les 
idées stratégiques des acteurs politiques en tant qu’elles interagissent avec les 
institutions et les politiques publiques existantes.          
   2
Introduction 
Since the Reagan years, social scientists have debated the nature and the conditions of 
social policy change in the era of welfare retrenchment and restructuring. One key aspect of 
this debate is the potential role of existing institutions in structuring the reform process and 
making path-departing changes unlikely (e.g. Béland, 2005; Pierson, 1994; Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005; Weaver, 2000). Turning to recent US political events in order to shed light on 
this debate is relevant, as Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both arrived at the 
White House with ambitious plans to reshape federal social policy. Most explicitly Clinton 
campaigned in 1992 on the promise ‘to end welfare as we know it’ and to bring significant 
change to US health care arrangements. The former promise, in particular, was critical to the 
development of Clinton’s New Democrat persona. Candidate Bush’s 2000 campaign was less 
specific in terms of its social policy agenda but along with the initial rhetoric about 
‘compassionate conservatism’ and faith based initiatives Bush also later developed the theme 
of the ‘ownership society’ and put forward controversial proposals to restructure Social 
Security in a manner that would effectively have constituted a partial privatization of that 
program. In the end both presidencies did witness major social policy legislation with the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) enacted in 
August 1996 and the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) signed into law December 2003. 
Both of these were complex pieces of legislation with significant aspects that remained 
relatively hidden from public view; the headline elements were clear enough, however, as 
PRWORA added tough new work requirements to the US welfare system while the MMA 
added a major new prescription drug benefit to Medicare. 
  Yet, both presidents also suffered what turned out to be hugely politically damaging 
defeats in their quests for social policy reform. As it has been well documented the Health 
Security Act (HSA), Clinton’s 1993 health insurance initiative made no legislative progress   3
and came to be perceived as a major policy and political miscalculation that had long-term 
destabilizing effects on the Clinton administration (Skocpol, 1997). Following his re-election 
President Bush determined in 2005 to use his renewed political capital to push for Social 
Security reform. If anything, however, this resulted in even more desultory defeat than 
Clinton suffered with health insurance (Weiner, 2007).  
The purpose of this paper is to examine what these narratives from the Clinton and 
Bush eras reveal about the wider possibilities for social policy change the United States. Most 
particularly, why were Presidents Clinton and Bush able to achieve their goals in some policy 
realms but so badly defeated in others? One striking aspect is that the successes came in 
policy domains that might be considered threatening as measured in traditional partisan terms 
for the two presidents. Furthermore, the direction of reform, or at least the headline element 
of reform, was ideologically counterintuitive. That is, Democrats had traditionally been more 
supportive of the rights of welfare recipients, but PRWORA rewrote the relationship between 
welfare recipients and the state with much greater emphasis placed on the duties of the 
former and less on the obligations of the latter. On the other hand, Republicans were 
perceived as being hostile to the expansion of social insurance schemes; yet Bush celebrated 
signing into law an expensive new entitlement as part of the Medicare program. In contrast 
the two presidents suffered ignominious defeat when pursuing policies that were much more 
in tune with their loyalist partisans and their traditional ideological preferences. Providing 
universal health insurance coverage was a long-term goal of the liberal wing of the 
Democratic Party, while conservative Republicans were keen to move beyond the collectivist 
Social Security system that has been a bulwark of the federal welfare state since the New 
Deal.  
In order to analyse these issues the paper is divided into two parts. First, it looks at the 
failed reform attempts where Clinton and Bush tried fundamentally to realign major aspects   4
of federal social policy in a way that reflected the hopes of their respective liberal and 
conservative constituencies. Why, in these instances with such high political and policy 
stakes, was reform thwarted despite dedicated presidential leadership? Second, the paper 
looks at the successful attempts at reform. Why, in these cases, was reform achieved despite 
the fact that there was deep unease within each president’s own party about the direction 
reform was taking? The paper concludes by developing a comparative and theoretically 
informed discussion of these two puzzles. As argued, institutional variation from one policy 
area to another largely accounts for each of these puzzles. On the one hand, strong 
institutional obstacles in the fields of Social Security and health insurance largely explain the 
defeat of the most ambitious social policy proposal put forward by each president. On the 
other hand, successful reforms occurred in a comparatively favourable institutional context. 
Yet, the analysis also suggests that paying close attention to the strategic ideas of political 
actors as they interact with existing institutions and policy legacies is necessary to fully 
understand the politics of social policy reform.     
At this point, one must note that the paper does not mean to imply a simple symmetry 
between the events of the Clinton and the W. Bush administrations. There were some 
similarities in the political contexts of the 1990s and 2000s but there were also important 
differences. For example, the political parallels stand out when the ambitious health insurance 
and Social Security reform proposals are investigated as both these efforts faltered during 
periods of unified government as first congressional Democrats and then congressional 
Republicans failed to rally around their president. On the other hand, the successful 
legislative initiatives, PRWORA and MMA, came to fruition in quite different partisan 
contexts. PRWORA was legislated at a time of divided government with President Clinton 
ceding much ground to congressional Republicans who voted overwhelmingly in favour of 
the law while the congressional Democrats were bitterly divided (Weaver, 2000). The MMA   5
was passed under unified Republican government with President Bush instrumental in 
forcing his own party to follow his wishes with a majority of Democrats opposed (Jaenicke 
and Waddan, 2006: 231-37). Moreover, there were some differences in the leadership styles 
of the two presidents. Clinton’s White House was a relatively chaotic place (Stephanopoulus, 
1999). In contrast Bush has run a well-organized operation that has been determined to 
impose its will through whatever means necessary (Aberbach, 2005). On the other hand, both 
administrations fit with George C. Edwards’s model of campaigning presidencies (Edwards, 
2007). Overall, as argued, despite the contextual and leadership differences, comparing, and 
where necessary contrasting, the experiences of Presidents Clinton and Bush in the social 
policy arena helps further our understanding of the politics of social policy in the United 
States. 
 
Policy Failures  
Health Insurance 
The US health system is a fragmented order in which private insurance companies 
and health care providers tend to oppose major changes that may jeopardize their profit 
margins or their prominent status within that system (Skocpol, 1997). Largely for that reason, 
retrospective commentaries on the Clinton administration's efforts to overhaul the US health 
care system have tended to portray the HSA as recklessly over-ambitious. Liberal economist 
Henry Aaron, for example, commented that nothing on a scale ‘remotely approximating the 
size and complexity’ of the HSA had been enacted outside of war or economic depression 
(Aaron, 1995: 3). Contrary to much of the post-1994 commentary there was, however, a 
general sense amongst contemporaries that significant reform was likely, or at least possible, 
in the 103
rd Congress (Peterson, 1998: 221; Hacker, 2001: 63). And, when Clinton came to 
office there was considerable evidence that the US health care system was ripe for reform. By 
1992 health care expenditures accounted for 13.4 percent of US GDP with costs rising for   6
both employers who provided health care benefits for their workers and to government (Patel 
and Rushefsky, 1999: 162). The rising expenditures, however, were not leading to a reduction 
in the overall number of uninsured Americans. In 1987 31 million, constituting 12.9 percent 
of the population, were uninsured. By 1993 the number of uninsured stood at 39.7 million 
amounting to 15.3 percent of the population (US, 1996, Table 173: 120). Hence, the 
uncertainties generated by rising costs and rising uninsurance in the early 1990s demanded 
attention. Furthermore, for a President elected with only 43 percent of the vote in a mood of 
general cynicism (Nelson, 1993: 145-6), the chance of pushing through comprehensive 
reform of the US health care system reform offered the opportunity to stake out a real 
‘signature’ issue (Skowronek, 1997). 
Moreover, the administration crafted a bill that it felt was in line with the campaign 
commitment to preserve ‘personal choice, private care, private insurance, private 
management’ (cited in Skocpol, 1997: 45). Thus there was a strong message about the need 
for decisive change coupled with reassurance that this was not going to lead to the 
‘socializing’ of American medicine. In order to achieve these goals the administration 
alighted on the concept of ‘managed competition’, eschewing the more leftist reform models 
represented by the ‘single payer’ and ‘play-or-pay’ designs. A ‘single payer’ system would 
effectively have constituted government run health-care as it would have largely undone the 
private insurance system and funded care through taxation. ‘Play-or-pay’ would have left 
employers to choose whether to provide insurance for their employees or pay money into a 
government fund to pay for coverage for the remaining uninsured. Clinton rejected these 
ideas but embraced the emerging principles of managed competition as a means of 
accomplishing significant reform while leaving intact the essence of a private, insurance 
based system (Skocpol, 1995: 69-70; Starr, 1994). Walter Zelman, one of the inner-circle that   7
designed the HSA, described the strategy as aiming ‘to overcome the ideological and political 
deadlock that has marked the reform debate over the past decade’ (Zelman, 1994: 11). 
Hence the aim was ‘to co-opt the left and right simultaneously’ bringing along 
‘voters, interest groups, and centrist members of Congress’ (Peterson, 2005: 220). Peterson 
further explains the legislative strategy as one where, rather than working directly with 
Republicans, the administration would pursue its bill expecting that moderate Republicans 
would pursue their own version of health insurance reform that moved towards similar goals 
if more slowly and with a lighter regulatory touch. A final compromise would then emerge 
(221). Any expectation, however, that the debate about health insurance reform would be a 
discussion about the technical merits of the HSA versus other reform plans was misplaced. 
Ideology and politics were at the forefront of Republican minds. In his memoirs Clinton 
reflects on how Newt Gingrich revealed how he had warned House Republicans that if the 
congressional Democrats passed the HSA then that would keep the Democrats in the majority 
‘for a long time’ (Clinton, W.J., 2004: 577-8): And GOP opposition was unwavering. In 
short, no matter how much the White House felt that it had offered a reform package that 
reflected a distinctively American approach to providing universal health insurance the 
President’s political opponents were not buying into this Third Way vision. Republicans 
perceived the reform effort in partisan terms and responded with parliamentary style 
discipline in their opposition. 
While, however, the steadfast opposition of the GOP meant that the legislative 
process would be difficult the lack of enthusiasm among Democrats was equally damaging. 
Some liberals were disappointed that the administration had passed up the more radical, and 
comprehensible, single payer and pay-or-play options. More harmful, though, was the 
scepticism from centrist Democrats who turned on the White House for adopting a Big 
Government approach. Hence, in the crucial months after the plan was unveiled, the HSA   8
was championed only softly by pro-reform constituencies and was denounced vigorously by 
its opponents. Prominent among these opponents were organized private interests, notably the 
Health Insurers Association of America and the National Federation of Independent 
Businesses, who led very public campaigns insisting that, whatever the problems with the US 
health system, the Clinton plan was not the solution. The public responded to these messages 
and by July 1994 polls showed that ‘endorsement of the plan had dropped from 57 percent to 
37 percent’ (Yankelovich, 1995: 11). With little action in Congress and dwindling public 
support the plan was damaged beyond repair. 
Considering how little legislative progress made the HSA made, the reform effort 
remains a subject of fascination to both political practitioners and academics.  Even a 
political generation after the event it is tempting to ask whether a different strategy might 
have prevailed. For example, Peterson speculated that a more robust, and distinctively liberal, 
approach might have given the supporters of comprehensive reform greater will to face down 
the organised opposition (2005: 227). Such speculation is of course little more than second 
guessing after the fact, but it does serve the purpose of highlighting the alternative strategic 
choices that were available. As it was the administration lost control of the agenda and a 
flagship policy commitment, designed to be representative of a new centrist governing 
paradigm, was ridiculed as liberal Big Government at its worst. In his memoirs Clinton 
insists: ‘contrary to how it was later portrayed, health experts generally praised it [the HSA] 
as moderate and workable. It certainly wasn’t a government take-over of the health-care 
system, as its critics charged.’ (Clinton, 2004; 549) The administration, however, lost this 
battle to frame the terms of the argument and ultimately, a social policy reform that might 
have reshaped the political map in favour of the Democrats ended up having exactly the 
opposite partisan effect (Béland et al, 2002). 
 
   9
Social Security 
The political incapacity of the Clinton administration to frame the policy argument, 
and the subsequent loss of legislative momentum, was repeated in 2005 with the Bush 
administration’s effort at Social Security reform. Like the US health insurance system, Social 
Security is a highly risky issue for politicians. This is especially true for Republicans, as 
Democrats have ‘owned the issue’ since the New Deal (Ross, 2007). The enduring popularity 
of Social Security and the sheer size of its ‘army of beneficiaries’ largely explain why it is 
known as ‘the third rail of American politics’ (Béland, 2005). If anything, President Bush’s 
efforts to drive his reform idea forward foundered even more quickly than had Clinton’s in 
early 1994. With the plan only formally unveiled in January 2005 there were already reports 
of the major obstacles it faced, including the uncertainty of congressional Republicans in 
contrast to the solid opposition of congressional Democrats, at the start of March (Stevenson, 
2005). 
As it is, the Bush administration’s effort to reform Social Security in 2005 has not 
generated the same degree of comment and literature, at least in the short-term aftermath, as 
the earlier health reform effort. Yet, the fate of the 2005 reform effort deserves proper 
investigation as it provides another example of presidential ambition to restructure a critical 
aspect of federal social policy being thwarted despite the auspicious circumstances of unified 
partisan government apparently offering the prospect of legislative success. And the 
administration certainly anticipated that it would be able to enact its will. At a gathering of 
congressional Republicans in January 2005 the newly re-elected President reaffirmed that 
Social Security reform was to be his primary domestic concern. Sensing some apprehension 
he emphasised: ‘I’ve got political capital, and now I’m going to spend it’ (Draper, 2007: 
296). Ironically, however, despite the fact that the 2004 election result was unequivocal, in 
contrast to the events of four years earlier, Bush’s reserve of political capital was diminished 
much more quickly than it had been in 2001.   10
Furthermore, this thwarting of presidential purpose came despite the huge effort that 
the administration put into persuading the public of the virtues of Social Security reform. 
According to Edwards it was ‘perhaps the most extensive public relations campaign in the 
history of the presidency’ (Edwards, 2007: 252) and this included extensive campaigning by 
the president himself.  
One problem for the administration was that it had to make the case that the Social 
Security was in trouble in order to make a discussion of the program’s future appear justified. 
That contrasted with the situation with regard to health insurance in the early 1990s. The 
problems surrounding the health care system arrived on the political scene organically so to 
speak, with a series of indicators pointing to the real and immediate problems of cost and 
access. In 2005, the problems of the Social Security system were not so immediately 
apparent. Hence the case for a major policy overhaul was less compelling. And, in terms of 
the potential political salience, there was certainly no Social Security moment equivalent to 
Harris Wofford’s victory in a 1991 special Senate election in Pennsylvania that was widely 
attributed to his campaign’s emphasis on health insurance (Hacker, 2002: 261-2). 
Nevertheless, the administration advanced with its plans arguing that the long term fiscal 
projections for Social Security required addressing and adding that its proposals would 
enhance individual choice in terms of retirement saving.  
Hence the administration’s strategy was to frame change as both a means of 
increasing individual choice and also as a response to an impending fiscal crisis. Bush had 
promoted the principle of Social Security privatization in the 2000 campaign and again in the 
2004 campaign he advanced the idea that younger workers would benefit from being allowed 
to invest some of their Social Security payroll tax in personal retirement accounts. To 
reinforce that ideological message the administration questioned the long-term fiscal viability 
of the existing Social Security system by pointing to the shift in the so-called dependency   11
ratio amid projections that the Social Security trust fund would not be able to fulfil all its 
obligations in a predictable future (Altman, 2005). Hence, in the public domain the 
administration presented its reform plan as both desirable and necessary. 
In terms of developing a legislative strategy there were both similarities and 
differences from the approach taken a dozen years earlier by the Clinton administration when 
it pushed for health insurance reform. Just as the HSA was an effort to legislate from the left-
in so the Social Security reform plan was going to have a build a legislative coalition from 
the right-in. That is, while both the Clinton and Bush White Houses anticipated bringing 
onboard moderate Republicans and Democrats respectively their starting point was to rely on 
the congressional majorities held by their parties. On the other hand, while the HSA was 
presented to Congress in glorious detail the Social Security plan was minimalist with the 
details left for Congress to fill in (Rosenbaum and Toner, 2005). That is, while Bush outlined 
the principles of his plans for personal accounts he was less forthcoming on the details about 
how he planned to restore fiscal stability. One tactic was to demand of the Democrats what 
they planned to do. Not surprisingly, controlling neither the White House nor Congress, 
Democrats demurred that such decisions be made by the Republican leadership. 
The lack of detail perhaps reflected a fundamental policy difficulty for the 
administration. That is, there was no clear linkage between the predictions of fiscal imbalance 
and the introduction of personal accounts. Indeed the reality was that there would have been 
huge transition costs since less money would be going into the trust fund if younger workers 
did opt to divert some of their Social Security payroll tax into personal accounts (Ross, 
2007). Thus, if the problem was defined as long-term fiscal insolvency then personal 
accounts were not an obvious solution to that problem. And if the fiscal position was to be 
changed then that would require painful decisions in the short-term about cutting benefits, 
raising the retirement age or increasing the payroll tax (this last course of action was not an   12
option likely to be considered by the Bush administration). Such decisions might be possible 
under the cloak of bipartisanship to share the blame around, but with most Democrats simply 
refusing to engage with the administration then it was most unlikely that Republicans would 
take the lead in what would essentially be a masochistic exercise taking immediate blame for 
a long-term objective.  
In his efforts to generate popular enthusiasm for the plan it is perhaps not surprising 
that President Bush initially emphasised the potential gains for younger workers in having 
personal accounts rather than on the downside of balancing the books.  Critically, however, 
the administration lost the battle for public opinion. Polls did show some support for the idea 
of allowing younger workers to invest in personal accounts, but even stronger was the 
sentiment that the existing structure of guaranteed benefits be maintained (Edwards, 2007: 
255-7). Moreover support for the Bush plan in fact declined as the President campaigned for 
it and, critically, opposition to the plan rose as its implications became better understood 
(Jacobson, 2007: 210-13). As it was polls did show that public awareness of the doubts cast 
on the program’s long-term future but this did not translate into a demand for immediate 
change.  
Overall, however, whatever progress was made in creating a climate that cast doubt 
on the future of Social Security the opposition to the Bush administration’s plans was 
vehement. In particular labor unions and the AARP campaigned against personal accounts 
being ‘carved out’ of the Social Security payroll contribution. In addition, supporters of 
traditional Social Security argued that privatization measures would in fact be to the 
detriment of many groups of Americans, including most women, African-Americans, and 
low-income citizens (Béland, 2005).  
Thus, even after Bush’s re-election, the political risks stemming from Social Security 
privatization had not declined and Democrats, in some disarray after the 2004 elections,   13
rallied to fight in order to preserve Social Security and use this cause as a powerful political 
weapon against Republicans (Weaver, 2005). The administration initially was confident that 
some Democrats would be persuaded to join the effort. Even when Senator Max Baucus (D. 
Montana), who had cooperated with the administration previously, told Karl Rove that no 
Democrats would support personal accounts as proposed by the administration Rove replied, 
‘You’re wrong. There’ll be people who have to come on this’ (Draper, 2007: 298). This 
proved to be a profound miscalculation. 
Moreover congressional Republicans did not fulfil the expectations of the 
administration and fall into line (Edwards, 2007: 264). One consequence of not presenting a 
detailed plan to Congress was that a variety of ideas were debated within Republican circles 
but no consensus developed. As Weiner notes, ‘Without a plan, many proposals emerged, 
fragmenting supporters of reform’ (Weiner, 2007: 888). 
Hence, the administration’s attempt to reform Social Security was undermined by 
strategic blunders. Given how firmly embedded the existing system was in terms of both its 
institutional fortifications and its widespread popularity (Ross, 2007) this was always a 
hugely ambitious project. In some ways the Bush administration did use the Clinton health 
reform effort as a negative template, most notably with the decision to release only the 
outline of a plan rather than hundreds of detailed pages. In the end, however, this attempt to 
provide a general ideological framework while leaving the detail to congressional negotiation 
meant that no definitive proposal emerged. Moreover, the administration unwisely assumed 
that congressional Republicans would comply with its wishes as they had very largely done 
through the first term. This assumption, however, neglected to take into account the different 
institutional and particularly electoral horizons of congressional Republicans (Sinclair, 2006: 
240-1). Even those members sympathetic to the principle of personal accounts were unsure of 
quite how these should look and worried about prevailing public opinion (Allen and Baker,   14
2005). Moreover, just as had been the case a dozen years previously when Clinton launched 
the HSA, the administration seemed unprepared for the level of hostility from both organized 
interests and partisan opposition. 
 
Successful Reforms 
The failures of the reform efforts described above illustrate how opponents of reform 
hold the institutional and political advantages the United States. That is, it is easier to 
generate coalitions to preserve the status quo than to build risk-taking alliances to change 
matters.  So what was different about welfare and prescription drugs that legislation was 
enacted? Did the two presidents choose more effective strategies in these instances or do the 
different legislative outcomes tell us more about the nature of the issues that were being 
debated? And how significant was it that a Democratic president signed into law a 
retrenchment of an existing welfare program while a Republican president celebrated the 
passage of legislation that was, at least in terms of its spending commitments, an expansion 
of the welfare state? 
 
The 1996 Welfare Reform 
In the United States, AFDC (Aid for Families with Dependent Children) became a 
major target for conservative mobilization during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. 
This mobilization weakened the political legitimacy of the program which, as opposed to 
Medicare and Social Security, was hardly popular among the middle class. This is why 
conservatives could pressure President Clinton to abolish the program, something they could 
not explicitly do regarding Social Security, for example (Ross, 2007).  
When President Clinton signed PRWORA in August 1996 he was able to portray it as 
fulfilling his 1992 campaign commitment to ‘end welfare as we know it’: And the importance 
of that message in 1992 to establishing Clinton’s political identity as ‘New’ Democrat should   15
not be underestimated. In his account of the New Democrat movement Baer explains the 
importance of welfare as an issue: ‘Welfare reform – and the theory of governance that 
undergirded it – was, quite simply, the most significant policy innovation that differentiated 
Clinton from liberal Democrats’ (Baer, 2000: 214). And through the 1992 campaign the 
message to ‘end welfare as we know it’ was heavily promoted, particularly in potential swing 
states in the weeks leading to the general election. 
On the other hand, once in office welfare reform was not an immediate priority. The 
administration did bring forward proposals in the summer of 1994 but this was only after 
huge political capital and energy had been expended on the 1993 budget, getting NAFTA 
ratified and then pursuing health insurance reform. In fact, according to some commentators, 
this prioritization of health insurance over welfare was a huge political error. Following the 
1994 mid-term elections Kaus speculated that if the administration had prioritized welfare 
over health insurance reform, ‘we might now be talking about a Democratic realignment 
rather than a Republican realignment’ (Kaus, 1995: xiv). Indeed Clinton himself suggests that 
had he abandoned health insurance reform earlier and moved on to pursue welfare reform 
then 'We might not have lost either House' (Clinton, W.J., 2004: 631). Whatever the reality of 
these reflections, they do help illustrate the perception that delivering on the promise of 
welfare reform was pivotal to the administration’s political fortunes. 
As it was, there was no serious legislative action on the administration’s own proposal 
in 1994 and after the mid-term elections of that year the dynamics surrounding welfare 
reform shifted considerably to the right. Many liberal Democrats had in fact repudiated the 
1994 plans as too harsh on welfare recipients (Weaver, 1998) but by 1996 these protestors 
were marginal voices in the reform debate. Welfare reform was a prominent part of the 
Contract with America on which many congressional Republicans, especially for the House, 
campaigned in 1994. And once in control of Capitol Hill the party leadership was keen to   16
pursue the issue. There were disagreements over the specifics of reform (Weaver, 2000: 252-
315) but there was a determination to push legislation through in the knowledge that this 
would leave the GOP in a win-win situation. Either there would be significant reform of the 
welfare system according to conservative ideas or President Clinton would veto their 
proposals and leave himself vulnerable to the charge that he had reneged on his commitment 
to welfare reform. In brief the new law devolved primary responsibility for running welfare 
to the states, but it stipulated that recipients be restricted to two years benefits before being 
required to engage in work activity. It also laid down a five-year lifetime limit for welfare 
receipt. Thus PRWORA acknowledged that government has an initial obligation to aid those 
falling on hard times, but it also stated that after a time government no longer has an 
obligation to continue to help. 
The critical moment on welfare reform came in summer of 1996 when the President 
had to decide whether to sign PRWORA. Clinton had in fact twice vetoed bills that contained 
welfare provisions similar to PRWORA. In December 1995 welfare reform was contained in 
a much broader reconciliation package and in January 1996 the welfare proposals arrived on 
Clinton’s desk accompanied by cuts to the Food Stamp and School Lunch programs. In both 
instances Clinton pointed to non-welfare aspects of the legislation as grounds for a veto 
(Weaver, 2000: 320).  
In the summer of 1996, however, the president’s strategic choices narrowed when he 
was presented with a bill free from previously contentious elements that did not deal directly 
with reforming welfare. There had been some disagreement in Republican ranks about 
whether to offer Clinton a ‘clean’ welfare bill or let GOP presidential candidate Bob Dole 
exploit the previous vetoes but in the end it was determined that a stand alone welfare bill 
would present Clinton with ‘a Hobson's choice of either giving the Dole campaign a good 
issue or alienating the liberal wing of the Democratic Party’ (Haskins, 2006: 304). If he   17
signed the legislation he would simultaneously be able to claim that he had fulfilled a 
campaign promise and finally reformed a welfare system that he genuinely disliked. On the 
other hand, PRWORA was clearly considerably to the right of his own initial reform 
proposals and signing the bill into law would upset core Democratic constituencies. Hence, 
the debate within the White House over whether the President should sign or veto PRWORA 
was a bitter one. Lobbying against PRWORA were the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services Donna Shalala, the chief-of-staff Leon Panetta and most of the policy advisers. 
Promoting the bill were the political advisers and one senior domestic policy adviser with ties 
to the DLC, Bruce Reed. Hillary Clinton also favoured signing the bill - even though this set 
her against many of her friends (Clinton, H., 2003: 369-70; see Edelman, 1997, for a strong 
attack on PRWORA from someone with close ties to Hillary Clinton). 
Underlying the debate was the question of whether a veto would give the GOP a 
wedge issue for the November elections. According to Dick Morris, polling showed that a 
veto would cost Clinton re-election (Morris, 1997: 300). Given the comfortable nature of 
Clinton’s re-election in November 1996 it seems unlikely that his victory would have been 
seriously threatened by a veto, but the angst that enveloped the administration over this 
decision illustrates just how high the policy and political stakes about welfare were perceived 
to be. 
In the end President Clinton signed the legislation and was keen publicly to celebrate 
the measure. Indeed the White House and congressional Republicans scrambled for the credit 
as the welfare rolls declined through the 1990s (Waddan, 2003). When reflecting on his 
presidency Clinton includes welfare reform among his list of achievements reflecting: 
‘Signing the welfare reform bill was one of the most important decisions of my presidency ... 
America needed legislation that changed the emphasis of assistance to the poor from 
dependence on welfare checks to independence through work’ (Clinton, 2004: 721). But the   18
final outcome was not an unambiguous success if Clinton’s original intent is taken into 
account. Whatever the merits of PRWORA it was a considerably more conservative measure 
than Clinton had originally advocated as illustrated by the disillusion of some of his early 
White House advisors on welfare (Bane, 1997; Ellwood, 1996). An important political 
objective was achieved, however, as welfare was defused as a potentially explosive issue in 
national politics. The image of the ‘welfare queen’ was a threat no more. 
 
The 2003 Medicare Reform 
Welfare reform was a pivotal part of candidate Clinton’s effort to portray himself as a 
New Democrat. Hence welfare reform was a policy proposal with a clear political message 
attached. In 2000 candidate Bush attempted to add to his political identity by talking of his 
belief in ‘compassionate conservatism’. This remained a somewhat ill defined concept and 
Bush’s political objective in adopting this message was not as stark as Clinton’s intent when 
emphasising his New Democrat credentials. Clinton was deliberately choosing to repudiate 
part of his party’s liberal past while Bush was adapting his party’s conservative philosophy 
rather than rejecting it (Jacobson, 2007: 48-50). Nevertheless, despite the ambiguities, 
compassionate conservatism was an important aspect of Bush’s campaigning persona. Early 
manifestations of policy proposals associated with the theme of compassionate conservatism 
were the promotion of faith-based initiatives and the demand for education reform. 
Furthermore, in 2003 President Bush also justified Medicare reform with reference to the 
compassionate agenda: ‘These reforms are the act of a vibrant and compassionate 
government’ (Bush, 2003). 
As it was, the reality for the Bush administration in December 2003 was that just as 
President Clinton ultimately signed a welfare bill that was some distance from his 
administration’s original proposals so too President Bush embraced a new prescription drug 
benefit for America’s seniors that was more expansive and expensive than he had initially   19
supported. In fact the initial political impetus that placed the idea of adding a prescription 
drug benefit to Medicare on the legislative agenda came in President Clinton’s 1999 State of 
the Union address when he proposed using the projected budget surpluses as a means of 
funding such a program (Clinton, 1999). In 2000 Al Gore took up this proposal as one of his 
campaign themes. Bush responded by promising that introducing a drug benefit for seniors 
would be a ‘priority’ for his administration (Carey, 2000). Polls still showed that Gore won a 
clear majority of voters declaring either health insurance or prescription drugs to be a key 
issue in deciding their vote (Exit Poll, 2000), but the fact that Bush felt compelled to respond 
on the subject illustrated that the prescription drug issue was a political threat that needed to 
be countered rather than simply neglected (Finegold and Skocpol, 1995). This is true because, 
like Social Security, Medicare is a popular program that has generated a powerful ‘army of 
beneficiaries’ represented by influential organizations like the AARP, which pressured the 
Bush administration to support the expansion of Medicare.    
Critically this pressure to act survived the transformation of the fiscal balance sheet as 
the brief promise of budget surpluses disappeared as quickly as it had emerged and deficit 
and increased debt once more became the order of the day. Indeed even as the aggregate 
budget numbers worsened something of a bidding war developed as the two parties offered 
increasingly expansive prescription drug benefit plans. Democratic proposals were always 
more expensive than Republican ones, but importantly the White House shifted from its 
initial preference to means test access to any new benefit to a position granting universal 
eligibility. Ironically the advent of unified Republican government after the mid-term 
elections of 2002 meant that the administration and congressional Republicans came under 
increased pressure to deliver on their promises to create an expensive new entitlement, 
normally an anathema to conservatives, in order to avoid giving the Democrats an issue in 
2004 (Carey, 2002).   20
In its final form the MMA was a complex piece of legislation. The headline aspect 
was a new prescription drug benefit for the elderly that was initially estimated to cost $410 
billion over ten years. In addition to this, however, there were significant elements of 
conservative policy layering (Hacker, 2004). For example, the availability of Heath Savings 
Accounts was expanded (for a full account of the conservative aspects of the bill see Jaenicke 
and Waddan, 2006). One striking aspect of the successful passage of the legislation was the 
role played by the White House. Indeed at times President Bush and the congressional 
Republican leadership displayed not so much leadership as henchmanship in order to push 
the bill through (Sinclair, 2006: 143-6). 
Two features in particular illustrate the determination to enact the legislation. First, 
when the House voted on the final version of the bill the roll call vote was held open for an 
extraordinary three hours through the night in order to transform what looked like defeat into 
victory as Speaker Hastert and HHS Secretary Thompson sought to convert wavering 
Republicans who were worried by the cost of the benefit (Pear and Toner, 2003). Bush’s 
Legislative Affairs Director David Hobbs even telephoned to wake a jetlagged president at 
4.00 AM so that he could personally talk to those still uncertain of how to vote (Draper, 
2007: 280). Second, with regard to the cost of the bill there is considerable evidence that ‘the 
Bush administration covered up legitimate cost estimates in an attempt to put through a more 
expensive program than many in Congress thought that they were voting for’ (Aberbach, 
2005: 141). Within two months of the bill’s enactment the administration revised its estimate 
of likely cost from $410 billion over ten years to $534 billion. This led to much hand-
wringing amongst conservatives; for example, Senator Trent Lott reflected that ‘I think I 
made a big mistake…. That’s one of the worst votes I’ve cast in my 32 years in Congress’ 
(Carey, 2005: 726).   21
Overall, therefore, despite some conservative cries of betrayal about creating a new 
entitlement (Bartlett, 2006) the Bush administration was directly responsible for the MMA’s 
contents in a fashion that the Clinton administration could not claim to be with respect to the 
final version of welfare reform. Indeed the White House’s victory over the MMA, coupled 
with its capacity to push through its controversial tax cuts, helped persuade key 
administration figures such as Andrew Card that they would be able to get their way over 
Social Security (Draper, 2007: 294).  
 
Discussion 
It is now possible to offer a more systematic discussion of the four reform attempts 
analyzed above. A first remark is that the benefit of hindsight stresses the obstacles facing the 
health insurance and Social Security reform efforts of President Clinton and Bush, 
respectively. For Presidents Clinton and Bush, however, there was a compelling rationale for 
embarking on these reform efforts. That is, the potential rewards of success were great. If 
either the Clinton or Bush plans had prevailed then they would have significantly transformed 
key areas of public policy. Hence it is not surprising that these reform efforts produced such 
high stakes political and policy battles. In 1993 influential Republican strategist William 
Kristol urged that the HSA be ‘killed’ since successful reform might ‘revive the reputation of 
the party that spends and regulates’ (Johnson and Broder, 1997: 234). Furthermore, as 
journalist and commentator Fred Barnes, one of the foremost champions of President Bush, 
noted, Social Security was the ‘crown jewel of liberal programs’ (Barnes, 2006: 138). As it 
turned out, both presidents overestimated the institutional advantages conferred by unified 
government and committed presidential leadership. The forces of opposition to change were 
formidable and, critically, the enduring policy legacies embedded in the health insurance and 
Social Security arenas had created an environment that gave this opposition a powerful voice. 
That is, the existing Social Security and private health insurance systems have created   22
powerful constituencies that can fight aggressively to protect their perceived interests, which 
generally corresponded to institutional status quo. In the case of Social Security, current and 
future beneficiaries represented by the AARP and, implicitly, Democrats in Congress 
defeated President Bush’s push to privatize Social Security (Altman, 2005). In the case of 
health insurance reform under Clinton, Republicans worked with insurance companies, small 
businesses and other private interests to derail President Clinton’s Health Security legislation 
(Skocpol, 1997).  
In contrast PRWORA and the MMA invoked different political and policy dynamics. 
In political terms successful health insurance or Social Security reform might have worked, in 
the long-term, to re-order the political landscape since ‘Social policies may powerfully affect 
citizens’ relationship to government because they typically provide them with their most 
personal and significant experiences of government in action’ (Mettler, 2007: 193; see also 
Campbell, 2003, on the interaction between people’s understanding of government programs 
and future policy developments). Hence these were policy goals with potentially 
transformative political effects in the medium to long term. The strategic ideas that drove 
Clinton’s efforts at welfare reform and Bush’s push for the passage of a prescription drugs 
bill as part of Medicare were more immediate and tangible. In these instances the two 
presidents were working to neutralise the political impact of issues ‘owned’ by their 
opponents (Ross, 1997). This in turn helps explain the confusing partisan patterns in 
congressional voting on these issues with some unhappy Democrats voting for PRWORA and 
a number of Republicans corralled into supporting the MMA. 
  Critically, however, the difference between success and failure in social policy reform 
for Clinton and Bush did not just reflect the strategic ideas of the presidents and legislators. 
Institutional factors help explain why both Bush and Clinton were successful in promoting 
major reforms that challenged the traditional ideological commitment of their party. In the   23
case of welfare reform it is instructive to compare AFDC beneficiaries with Social Security 
recipients. The former were far less politically organized and influential than the latter. 
Because AFDC had such a weak constituency, it became much easier for conservatives to 
pressure Democrats to abolish it. With respect to prescription drugs, Medicare, like Social 
Security, is a hugely popular program that has a strong army of beneficiaries willing to 
support its preservation or even expansion. Because President Bush proposed the expansion 
of Medicare, he could gather support from this constituency. In the end, even the AARP 
supported the 2003 Medicare reform, which contrasts with its opposition to President Bush’s 
Social Security initiative (Altman, 2005).  
  Theoretically, this article provides more ground to historical institutionalism, an 
approach that stresses the structuring role of political institutions and existing policy legacies 
in the policy-making process (e.g. Béland, 2005; Pierson, 1994; Ross, 2007; Weaver, 2000). 
Clearly, one cannot understand the social policy successes and failures of both Presidents 
Clinton and W. Bush without taking into account institutional variation from a policy area to 
another. This remark is consistent with historical institutionalism (Pierson, 1994). Yet, 
theoretically, the article also emphasizes the need for scholars to study the strategic ideas of 
politicians, which interact with existing institutions in a complex manner. In the same 
institutional context, political actors can have very different ideas about how to reach their 
goals, and paying attention to such ideas is essential to understand the policy process (Béland, 
2005). Finally, this article shows that, despite strong institutional constraints, major social 
policy reforms are possible the United States. The 1996 federal welfare reform provides 
ground to this claim. This means that one must reject overly deterministic accounts 
suggesting that bold reform is impossible in the United States because of the obstacles to 
change created by divided government and other forms of power fragmentations (e.g. 
Steinmo and Watts, 1995). Overall, the study of institutions is essential to policy analysis but   24
the institutional focus should not lead to a static vision according to which existing policy 
legacies make path departing change hardly possible in the first place (Streeck and Thelen, 




Aaron, H. J. (1995), ‘The Problem That Won't Go Away,’ in Henry Aaron (ed.), The Problem 
That Won't Go Away: Reforming US Health Care Financing. (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press) 1-12. 
Aberbach, J. (2005), ‘The Political Significance of the George W. Bush Administration’, 
Social Policy and Administration, 39(2): 130-149.  
Allen, M. and Peter Baker (2005) Hill takes a back seat on Social Security: Administration, 
Republican national Committee Lead Drive to Add Private Accounts’ in The 
Washington Post, 6
th April, A04  
Altman, N. (2005), The Battle for Social Security: From FDR’s Vision to Bush’s Gamble. 
Hoboken, NJ: Weiley.  
Baer, K.  (2000) Reinventing Democrats: the politics of liberalism from Reagan to Clinton 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas). 
Bane, M.J. (1997), ‘Welfare as we Might Know it’, The American Prospect, 30: 47-55. 
Bartlett, B. (2006), Impostor: How George W. Bush Bankrupted America and Betrayed the 
Reagan Legacy (New York: Doubleday). 
Barnes, F. (2006), Rebel-in-Chief: Inside the Bold and Controversial Presidency of George 
W. Bush (New York: Crown Forum). 
Béland, D. (2005), Social Security: History and Politics from the New Deal to the 
Privatization Debate. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas).   25
Béland, D., F. Vergniolle de Chantal and A. Waddan (2002), ‘Third Way Social Policy: 
Clinton’s Legacy?’ Policy and Politics, 30(1) 19-30. 
Bush, G.W. (2003), Remarks by the President at Signing of the Medicare Prescription Drug 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003. Washington, DC: December 8. 
Campbell, A. (2003), How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the 
American Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Carey, M. (2000), ‘Bush’s Medicare Drug Plan’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 9 
September: 2084. 
Carey, M. (2002), ‘Can GOP Make Good on Medicare drug Pledge’ Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly, 23 November: 3064-65 
Carey, M (2005), ‘Lott Laments His Medicare Vote’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 27 
March: 726. 
Clinton, W.J. (1999), State of the Union Address. (Washington, DC: The White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary), 19 January. 
Clinton, W.J. (2004), My Life, (London: Hutchinson) 
Clinton, W.J. and A. Gore (1992), Putting people first: a strategy for change, (New York: 
Times Books). 
Clinton, H.R. (2003), Living History (London: Headline Publishing) updated edition. 
Draper, R. (2007), Dead Certain: The presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Free 
Press). 
Edelman, P. (1997), ‘The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done’ Atlantic Monthly, March 
1997: 43-58 
Edwards, G.C (2007), Campaigning by Governing: The Politics of the Bush Presidency (New 
York: Pearson Longman). 
Ellwood, D., (1996), ‘Welfare Reform As I Knew It’, The American Prospect, No. 26: 22-29.   26
Exit Poll, (2000), http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/epolls/US/P000.html 
Finegold K. and T. Skocpol (1995), State and party in America’s New Deal (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press). 
Hacker, J.S. (2001), ‘Learning From Defeat? Political Analysis and the Failure of Health 
Care Reform in the United States’, British Journal of Political Science, 31(1): 61-94. 
Hacker, J.S. (2002), The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social 
Benefits in the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press). 
Hacker, J.S. (2004), ‘Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden 
Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States’, American Political 
Science Review, 98(2): 243-260. 
Haskins, R. (2006), Work Over Welfare: The Inside Story of the 196 Welfare Reform Law 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press). 
Jacobson, G. (2007), A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People 
(New York: Pearson Longman). 
Jaenicke, D. and Waddan, A. (2006b), President Bush and Social Policy: The Strange Case of 
the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Political Science Quarterly, 121, 2: 217-40. 
Johnson, h. and D. Broder (1997), The System: The American Way of Politics at Breaking 
Point (Boston: little, Brown and Company). 
Kaus, M. (1995), The End of Equality, (New York: Basic Books). 
Mettler, S (2007), ‘The Transformed Welfare State and the redistribution of Political Voice’ 
in P. Pierson and T. Skocpol eds. The Transformation of American Politics: Activist 
Government and the Rise of Conservatism (Princeton University Press) 191-222. 
Morris, D., (1997), Behind the Oval Office: Winning the Presidency in the Nineties (New 
York: Random House).   27
Nelson, M. (1993), ‘The Presidency: Clinton and the cycle of politics and policy’, in M. 
Nelson ed. The Elections of 1992, (Washington Dc: CQ Press) 125-152.  
Patel, K. and Rushefsky, M.E. (1999), Health Care Politics and Policy in America, second 
edition, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe). 
Pear, R and R. Toner (2003) ‘A Final Push In Congress: The Overview; Sharply Split, House 
Passes Broad Medicare Overhaul; Forceful Lobbying By Bush’ in The New York 
Times, 23
rd November 
Peterson, M.A. (1998), ‘The Politics of Health Care Policy: Overreaching in an Age of 
Polarization’ in M. Weir (ed.), The Social Divide: Political Parties and the Future of 
Activist Government (Washington DC; The Brookings Institution): 181-229 
Peterson, M.A. (2005), ‘The Congressional Graveyard for Health Care Reform’ in J.A. 
Morone and L.R. Jacobs eds. Healthy, Wealthy and Fair: Health Care and the Good 
Society, (New York: Oxford University Press), 205-234. 
Pierson, P. (1994) Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of 
Retrenchment, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press. 
Rosenbaum, D. and R. Toner (2005), ‘State of the Union: Retirement Plans; Introducing 
Private Investments to the Safety Net’, New York Times, February 3. 
Ross, F. (2007), ‘Policy Histories and Partisan Leadership in Presidential Studies: The Case 
of Social Security’ in G. Edwards and D. king eds. The Polarized Presidency of 
George W. Bush (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Sinclair, B. (2006), Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press). 
Skocpol, T. (1995), ‘The Rise and Resounding Demise of the Clinton Plan’, Health Affairs, 
15 (Spring): 66-85.   28
Skocpol, T. (1997), Boomerang: Health Care Reform and the Turn against Government, 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company). 
Skowronek, S. (1997), The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill 
Clinton (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press). 
Starr, P. (1994), The Logic of Health Care Reform: Why and How the President’s Plan Will 
Work, revised edition (New York: Penguin Books). 
Steinmo, S. and J. Watts (1995), ‘It’s the Institutions, Stupid! Why Comprehensive National 
Health Insurance Always Fails in America’, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and 
Law, 20(2): 329-372. 
Stephanopoulos, G., (1999), All Too Human: A Political Education, (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company). 
Streeck, W. and K. Thelen (eds) (2005), Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in 
Advanced Political Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Stevenson R. (2005), ‘For President’s Social Security Proposal, Many Hurdles’, New York 
Times, March 2.  
U.S. (1996), Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1996, (116
th edition), (Washington DC: 
Bureau of the Census). 
Waddan, A. (2003), ‘Redesigning the Welfare Contract in Theory and Practice: Just what is 
Going on in the USA,’ Journal of Social Policy, 32(1): 19-35. 
Weaver, R. K., (2005), ‘Public Pension Reform in the United States’ in Giuliano Bonoli, 
Giuliano and Toshimitsu Shinkawa (eds.) Ageing and Pension Reform around the 
World: Evidence from Eleven Countries. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar: 230-251. 
Weaver, R.K. (1998), ‘Ending Welfare as We Know It’, in M. Weir (ed.), The Social Divide: 
Political Parties and the Future of Activist Government, (Washington DC; The 
Brookings Institution): 361-416.   29
Weaver, R.K. (2000), Ending Welfare As We Know It, (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press). 
Weiner T. (2007), ‘Touching the Third Rail: Explaining the Failure of Bush’s Social Security 
Initiative’ in Politics and Policy, 35(4): 872-897.  
Yankelovich, D. (1995), ‘The Debate That Wasn’t: The Public and the Clinton Plan’, Health 
Affairs, 15 (Spring): 7-23. 
Zelman, W.A. (1994), ‘The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Reform Plan’, Health 
Affairs, 14(Spring): 9-29. 
 
 SEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
33
(2007)
No. 168: Health human resources planning and the production of health:
Development of an extended analytical framework for needs-







No. 169: Gender Inequality in the Wealth of Older Canadians M. Denton
L. Boos
No. 170: The Evolution of Elderly Poverty in Canada K. Milligan
No. 171: Return and Onwards Migration among Older Canadians:
Findings from the 2001 Census
K.B. Newbold
No. 172: Le système de retraite américain: entre fragmentation et
logique financière
D. Béland
No. 173: Entrepreneurship, Liquidity Constraints and Start-up Costs R. Fonseca
P.-C. Michaud
T. Sopraseuth
No. 174: How did the Elimination of the Earnings Test above the
Normal Retirement Age affect Retirement Expectations?
P.-C. Michaud
A. van Soest









No. 177: Retirement Saving in Australia G. Barrett
Y.-P. Tseng




No. 179: Older Workers and On-the-Job Training in Canada:




No. 180: Private Pensions and Income Security in Old Age:
An Uncertain Future – Conference Report
M. Hering
M. KpessaSEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
34
No. 181: Age, SES, and Health: A Population Level Analysis of Health
Inequalitites over the Life Course
S. Prus





No. 183: Home and Mortgage Ownership of the Dutch Elderly:
Explaining Cohort, Time and Age Effects
A. van der Schors
R.J.M. Alessie
M. Mastrogiacomo









No. 186: Which Canadian Seniors Are Below the Low-Income
Measure?
M.R. Veall
No. 187: Policy Areas Impinging on Elderly Transportation Mobility:








No. 189: Psychosocial resources and social health inequalities in




No. 190: Health-Care Utilization in Canada: 25 Years of Evidence L.J. Curtis
W.J. MacMinn
No. 191: Health Status of On and Off-reserve Aboriginal Peoples:
Analysis of the Aboriginal Peoples Survey
L.J. Curtis
No. 192: On the Sensitivity of Aggregate Productivity Growth Rates to
Noisy Measurement
F.T. Denton
No. 193: Initial Destination Choices of Skilled-worker Immigrants from




No. 194: Problematic Post-Landing Interprovincial Migration of the
Immigrants in Canada: From 1980-83 through 1992-95
L. Xu
K.L. LiawSEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
35
No. 195: Inter-CMA Migration of the Immigrants in Canada: 1991-
1996 and 1996-2001
L. Xu
No. 196: Characterization and Explanation of the 1996-2001 Inter-
CMA Migration of the Second Generation in Canada
L. Xu
No. 197: Transitions out of and back to employment among older men
and women in the UK
D. Haardt
No. 198: Older couples’ labour market reactions to family disruptions D. Haardt
No. 199: The Adequacy of Retirement Savings: Subjective Survey




No. 200: Underfunding of Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Benefit
Guarantee Insurance - An Overview of Theory and Empirics
M. Jametti
No. 201: Effects of ‘authorized generics’ on Canadian drug prices P. Grootendorst
No. 202: When Bad Things Happen to Good People: The Economic




No. 203: Relatively Inaccessible Abundance: Reflections on U.S.
Health Care
I.L. Bourgeault
No. 204: Professional Work in Health Care Organizations: The






No. 205: Who Minds the Gate? Comparing the role of non physician
providers in the primary care division of labour in Canada &
the U.S.
I.L. Bourgeault
No. 206: Immigration, Ethnicity and Cancer in U.S. Women J.T. McDonald
J. Neily
No. 207: Ordinary Least Squares Bias and Bias Corrections for iid
Samples
L. Magee
No. 208: The Roles of Ethnicity and Language Acculturation in
Determining the Interprovincial Migration Propensities in
Canada: from the Late 1970s to the Late 1990s
X. Ma
K.L. Liaw
No. 209: Aging, Gender and Neighbourhood Determinants of Distance
Traveled: A Multilevel Analysis in the Hamilton CMA
R. Mercado
A. PáezSEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
36




No. 211: Explaining the Health Gap between Canadian- and Foreign-




No. 212: “Midlife Crises”: Understanding the Changing Nature of
Relationships in Middle Age Canadian Families
K.M. Kobayashi
No. 213: A Note on Income Distribution and Growth W. Scarth
No. 214: Is Foreign-Owned Capital a Bad Thing to Tax? W. Scarth
No. 215: A review of instrumental variables estimation in the applied
health sciences
P. Grootendorst
No. 216: The Impact of Immigration on the Labour Market Outcomes
of Native-born Canadians
J. Tu
No. 217: Caregiver Employment Status and Time to Institutionalization
of  Persons with Dementia
M. Oremus
P. Raina
No. 218: The Use of Behaviour and Mood Medications by Care-





No. 219: Looking for Private Information in Self-Assessed Health J. Banks
T. Crossley
S. Goshev
No. 220: An Evaluation of the Working Income Tax Benefit W. Scarth
L. Tang
No. 221: The life expectancy gains from pharmaceutical drugs: a




No. 222: Cognitive functioning and labour force participation among
older men and women in England
D. Haardt




No. 224: Assessing Alternative Financing Methods for the Canadian
Health Care System in View of Population Aging
D. Andrews
No. 225: The Role of Coping Humour in the Physical and Mental
Health of Older Adults
E. Marziali
L. McDonald
P. DonahueSEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
37
No. 226: Exploring the Effects of Aggregation Error in the Estimation




No. 227: Using Statistics Canada LifePaths Microsimulation Model to
Project the Health Status of Canadian Elderly 
J. Légaré
Y. Décarie
No. 228: An Application of Price and Quantity Indexes in the Analysis

















No. 232: The Politics of Social Policy Reform in the United States: The
Clinton and the W. Bush Presidencies Reconsidered
D. Béland
A. Waddan